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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD L. JENSEN, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 870107 
v. : 
GARY DeLAND, Director, Department : Priority No. 3 
of Corrections, Utah State 
Prison, : 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a Petition for Rehearing on an appeal from a 
dismissal of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third 
Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON REHEARING 
1. Whether this Court should grant rehearing to 
consider requiring a criminal appellant to seek a remand for an 
evidentiary hearing prior to briefing on appeal if he desires to 
raise an ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim based upon 
matters outside the trial record? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner was charged with aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978). 
After a jury trial, petitioner was found guilty on June 6, 1985 
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings, 
presiding. 
Petitioner appealed his conviction of aggravated 
robbery to the this Court. This Court affirmed petitioner's 
conviction in State v. Jensen, 727 P.2d 201 (Utah 1986). 
Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County. After a hearing on January 23, 1987, Judge Richard H. 
Moffat dismissed the petition as procedurally barred. 
On appeal from the dismissal, this Court remanded the 
habeas corpus matter to the district court for an evidentiary 
hearing on petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel. Jensen v. DeLand, 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah Dec. 29, 
1989). (Addendum "A"; Slip Opinion.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts are set forth in the Brief of 
Respondent. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should grant rehearing to fully consider 
whether a criminal defendant should be required to raise an 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim on direct appeal by means 
of seeking a remand for an evidentiary hearing on matters outside 
the trial record. Additionally, this Court's opinion in Hafen v. 
Morris should be reaffirmed, distinguished, or overruled. 
Finally, the language requiring that an issue be voluntarily 
waived to establish procedural default should be modified as 
consistent with other case law. 
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ARGUMENT 
A CRIMINAL APPELLANT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO 
RAISE AN INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL CLAIM ON 
DIRECT APPEAL IF HE COULD HAVE SOUGHT A 
REMAND FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING REGARDING 
MATTERS NOT CONTAINED IN THE TRIAL RECORD. 
This appeal raises the perpetual conflict arising in 
postconviction relief actions; judicial economy v. access to the 
courts. See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1032-33 (Utah 1989). 
Rule 65B(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is designed to 
allow convicted criminals limited access to the courts when 
justice requires. Undoubtedly, prison inmates often take 
advantage of this limited right. For this reason, this Court has 
established procedural rules which require a showing of "unusual 
circumstances" for failure to timely raise a claim in the regular 
appellate process. When a claim could and should have been 
raised on direct appeal but was not, the claim is deemed waived 
or procedurally barred. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104-
05 (Utah 1983) . 
A dilemma arises when it is procedurally questionable 
whether a petitioner could have raised an issue on direct appeal. 
The State petitions for rehearing to offer a just and pragmatic 
solution to the problem arising when a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel cannot be raised on direct appeal due 
to the absence of an opportunity to create an appealable record 
on the issue. 
Typically, as in the present case, an appellate counsel 
may forego raising an ineffectiveness claim for the reason that 
there is no record support due to the nature of the claim, e.g., 
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failure to conduct pretrial investigations, failure to conduct 
discovery, lack of preparation at trial, failure to subpoena 
defense witnesses or failure to advise a petitioner of his 
rights. (See Br. of Resp. at 5). At present, there is no 
statute or rule which effectively allows a criminal appellant to 
supplement the trial record with extrajudicial evidence of 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel. A motion for new trial permits 
a postconviction evidentiary hearing, but must be filed within 
ten (10) days of the judgment and sentence. Utah R. Crim. P. 
24. In most cases, it is unlikely that new counsel on appeal 
will have the opportunity to review the trial record for 
ineffectiveness and timely file a motion for new trial on those 
grounds. But see State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) . 
The proposed solution is to procedurally allow a 
criminal appellant a limited opportunity to a remand for an 
evidentiary hearing on matters of "fundamental unfairness" which 
2 
by their nature are not contained on the record. The benefit of 
such a procedure is to forward the general policy favoring the 
finality of judgments. A criminal appellant would thus be 
procedurally required to raise on direct appeal a claim of 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel, unless he is also represented 
by trial counsel on appeal. <C£. Fernandez v. Cook, 121 Utah Adv. 
Another possible remedy would be to modify the new trial rule 
to extend the time for filing a motion for new trial when an 
ineffectiveness claim is presented by new counsel. 
o 
This remedy was applied by this Court in State v. Jones, 734 
P.2d 4 73 (Utah 1987) (remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of prosecutorial misconduct). 
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Rep. 13, 14 (Utah Nov. 16, 1989). This procedure would also 
avoid the use of postconviction relief as a secondary appellate 
process which effectively puts the original trial on trial. In 
theory, this would avoid unnecessary duplication of the judicial 
process. 
As this Court stated in its opinion, a criminal 
defendant should not be permitted to "strategically abstain from 
raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim which could be 
reviewed on direct appeal." Jensen v. DeLand, No. 870107, slip 
op. at 5 (Utah Dec. 29, 1989). Realistically, such "stop gap" 
language is unenforceable without a means of detecting when an 
ineffectiveness claim has been strategically withheld on appeal. 
By providing an opportunity for an appellant to timely raise and 
support an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal, a defendant 
would be procedurally barred from utilizing postconviction relief 
as a substitute for direct appeal. 
This proposed solution is novel and not without 
frailties. The State does not here attempt to analyze all the 
possible consequences. Suffice it to say that unless the 
proposed opportunity for a remand is properly tailored, the 
solution may become worse than the problem it seeks to solve. 
For this reason, a petition for rehearing is necessary to permit 
a full discussion of this alternative remedy. 
A further concern of the State is this Court's quiet 
disregard of the case of Hafen v. Morris, 632 P.2d 875 (Utah 
1981), cited by the State in its Supplemental Brief. The Hafen 
case was cited for the proposition that the silence of a 
defendant waives the right to raise an issue known to defendant 
at trial and on appeal. Id., at 876. In Hafen, the defendant had 
requested his trial attorney to challenge a juror who the 
defendant knew. lei. The defendant also claimed that he 
requested his trial attorney to raise the issue on appeal. Id. 
On appeal from a postconviction action, this Court held that the 
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was properly 
dismissed due to the defendant's silence at trial and on appeal. 
Id. 
The holding in Hafen is contrary to this Court's 
opinion in the present case. Here, defendant knew of the 
ineffectiveness issues and requested his appellate counsel to 
raise them on appeal. As in Hafen, defendant's appellate counsel 
did not honor his request. Defendant remained silent as did 
Hafen. No "unusual circumstances" exist in the present case 
beyond those found insufficient in Hafen to preclude application 
of the procedural waiver rule. 
The State requests this Court to acknowledge the Hafen 
case and reaffirm it, distinguish it, or overrule it. If this 
Court's opinion in the present case is permitted to stand as 
written, trial courts will be faced with inconsistent precedents 
regarding the doctrine of procedural waiver. 
Finally, the State is concerned with the broad language 
in the opinion which presumptively permits a habeas petitioner to 
raise an ineffective assistance claim unless "voluntarily 
waived." A requirement that an issue be voluntarily waived is 
inconsistent with the general rule of procedural waiver. The 
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well-settled inquiry in a postconviction case is whether an issue 
could and should have been procedurally raised on direct appeal. 
It should not be necessary for the State to affirmatively 
establish that a defendant was aware of an issue and that he 
voluntarily waived it. If this were so, a criminal defendant 
would never be barred from raising new issues after a direct 
appeal absent a finding of voluntary waiver similar to the 
findings required in entering a guilty plea. See Rule 11, Utah 
R. Crim. P. The State does not believe this Court intended such 
a requirement and requests that the language in the opinion be 
modified to avoid confusion or misinterpretation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to grant a rehearing to more fully consider the issues. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^>——day of February, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies o 
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-8-
APPENDIX A 
*v~C~-
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOO 
Richard L. Jensen, No. 870107 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
F I L E D 
v. December 29, 1989 
Gary DeLand, Director, 
Dept. of Corrections, Utah 
State Prison, State of Utah, 
Defendant and Appellee. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Attorneys: Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for appellant, 
R. Paul Van Dam, Dan R. Larsen, Salt Lake City, 
for appellee 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Richard L. Jensen appeals from the 
dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(i). 
Plaintiff was convicted of aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978) 
(amended 1989). He appealed to this Court, contending that 
there had been a violation of Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) at 
his trial through the admission of evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts contained in letters written by him. We 
affirmed his conviction in State v. Jensen, 727 P.2d 201 
(Utah 1986). 
Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus, alleging three central errors: (1) ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel at trial;1 (2) prosecutorial 
misconduct; and (3) court error. Defendant moved to dismiss 
his petition, which motion was granted by the trial court for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Plaintiff appeals, contending that he was entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
65B(i)(2) and (8). 
1. Plaintiff was represented by different attorneys at trial 
and on appeal. 
I 
At the threshold, we are confronted with the question 
whether plaintiff has waived his claims of error as to 
prosecutorial misconduct and trial court error. Specifically, 
he complains that the prosecutor (1) took an illegal 
deposition of plaintiff's alibi witness, (2) held a pretrial 
showing of evidence to witnesses, (3) obtained letters from 
plaintiff's alibi witness at an illegal deposition, 
(4) entered evidence without a proper showing of chain of 
custody, (5) objected to the introduction of evidence 
favorable to plaintiff, i.e., the rap sheet of a person other 
than plaintiff with the same name, (6) offered evidence to 
rebut prior identification of plaintiff, and (7) failed to 
give notice to plaintiff of the intent to call Terry Harris as 
a prosecution witness. As for court error, plaintiff asserts 
that the trial judge (1) allowed an improper offer of evidence 
by the prosecution (mugshot and hat), (2) allowed the taking 
and admission of an illegal deposition, (3) failed to instruct 
the jury as to the purpose of letters admitted into evidence, 
and (4) sentenced plaintiff to an enhanced term without filing 
a complaint or otherwise giving notice. 
All of these claims of misconduct and error could 
have been raised on plaintiff's direct appeal. State v. 
Jensen, 727 P.2d 201 (Utah 1986). We have repeatedly held 
that postconviction relief cannot be used to circumvent the 
regular appellate process. Andrews v. Shulsen, 773 P.2d 832, 
833-34 (Utah 1988); State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 898 n.4 (Utah 
1988) (Hall, C.J., dissenting); Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 
804 (Utah 1988); Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 
1987) (per curiam); Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d 787, 788 (Utah 
1986); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104-05 (Utah 1983); 
Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah 1981); Brown v. 
Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 1968). In 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1104, we stated that 
allegations of error occurring at trial must be raised on 
appeal or they are waived unless unusual circumstances exist: 
It is therefore well settled in this state 
that allegations of error that could have 
been but were not raised on appeal from a 
criminal conviction cannot be raised by 
habeas corpus or postconviction review, 
except in unusual circumstances. 
In Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d at 98-99, 440 P.2d at 969, we 
explained: 
[Habeas corpus] is an extraordinary 
remedy which is properly invocable only 
when the court had no jurisdiction over 
the person or the offense, or where the 
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requirements of law have been so 
disregarded that the party is 
substantially and effectively denied due 
process of law, or where some such fact is 
shown that it would be unconscionable not 
to re-examine the conviction. If the 
contention of error is something which is 
known or should be known to the party at 
the time the judgment was entered, it must 
be reviewed in the manner and within the 
time permitted by regular prescribed 
procedure, or the judgment becomes final 
and is not subject to further attack, 
except in some such unusual circumstance 
as we have mentioned above. Were it 
otherwise, the regular rules of procedure 
governing appeals and the limitations of 
time specified therein would be rendered 
impotent. 
(Emphasis added, footnote omitted.) Since plaintiff's 
complaints of prosecutorial misconduct and trial court error 
were known to him and his appellate counsel and could have 
been raised on his appeal to this Court but were not, they 
have been waived. No unusual circumstances have been pointed 
out to escape that result. 
II 
Plaintiff has explained his failure to raise on 
appeal his complaint of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel. In an unsworn written statement drafted by 
plaintiff and interlineated and signed by his appellate 
counsel, counsel states that he advised plaintiff not to 
raise the ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim on direct appeal. 
The statement reflects that plaintiff and his attorney 
understood the risk that waiver might be raised later. The 
statement reads: 
I, Earl Xiaz, the Attorney in the above 
Affidavit state: That I realize that my 
Client may not use the remedy of a Habeas 
Corpus as a substitute for a Direct 
Appeal. That a petitioner cannot raise 
issues in a Habeas proceeding that could 
or should have been raised on Direct 
Appeal. 
My Client has had the desire to raise 
other issues like Ineffectiveness of 
Counsel, but I have discouraged him from 
going in that direction because there is 
nothing in the record to support the 
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claim. Thus, an evidentiary hearing is 
required in which trial counsel should be 
called as a witness. They do not fit the 
rules for Direct Appeal points. 
My Client under my direction had left 
this point out because I have advised him 
to. If at a later date there arises a 
controversy from another court, I take 
full responsibility for my Clients' 
failure to bring up this point. 
I will be available at any time to 
answer any questions as to my judgements 
in Richard L. Jensen's Supreme Court 
Appeal or any other remedy. 
Furthermore, during the hearing on the State's motion to 
dismiss plaintiff's petition, plaintiff explained that he had 
attempted to raise the issue on direct appeal, but his 
counsel refused. Plaintiff characterizes his counsel's 
refusal as an "unusual circumstance." 
In the recent case of Fernandez v. Cook, P.2d , 
, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 14 (November 16, 1989), this Court 
held that because the defendant's trial attorney represented 
him on his first appeal, it was unreasonable to expect that 
attorney to raise the issue of his own ineffectiveness at 
trial on direct appeal. Such unusual circumstances made the 
defendant's habeas corpus petition his first and only means to 
raise the ineffectiveness issue. Id. at 14. We held that the 
district court erred in dismissing his petition without a 
hearing on the merits. Id. 
In the instant case, the written statement clearly 
shows that the claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel was 
deleted from plaintiff's direct appeal solely because of the 
advice of his appellate counsel that the claim could not 
properly be raised then. Under these circumstances, there was 
no waiver by plaintiff of that claim. In a somewhat similar 
situation, in Palmer v. Dermitt, 635 P.2d 955, 960 (Idaho 
1981), the plaintiff in a petition for post-conviction relief 
failed to raise issues of perjured testimony, manufactured 
evidence, and ineffective assistance of his prior 
post-conviction counsel due to the deletion of those issues 
from the plaintiff's original pro se petition by his 
court-appointed attorney without the knowledge or consent of 
the plaintiff. The Idaho court held that the omission of 
those issues was not an active, voluntary choice by the 
plaintiff. 
We conclude that plaintiff has not voluntarily waived 
his right to raise the ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim in his 
petition. An evidentiary hearing is appropriate here in light 
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of appellate counsel's clear advice at the time the appeal 
was taken that the issue could not appropriately be raised on 
appeal. Although the State argues that plaintiff has failed 
to raise a claim of constitutional magnitude, we pointed out 
in Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988), that if 
counsel's deficiencies were sufficiently grievous to deprive 
the plaintiff of effective assistance of counsel, they 
constitute a violation of due process that is clearly 
reviewable by habeas corpus review. See also Fernandez v. 
Cook, P.2d at , 121 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14; Martinez v. 
Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979). By our decision today, 
we do not suggest or imply that a criminal defendant may 
strategically abstain from raising an ineffective-assistance 
of-counsel claim which could be reviewed on direct appeal. 
We do not and will not sanction manipulation of that sort. 
It is impossible for us now to adequately review 
plaintiff's sixteen claims of ineffectiveness without an 
adequate record. See Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 
(Utah 1983); see also Johnson v. Morris, 645 P.2d 51, 52 
(Utah 1982) (per curiam). We therefore remand to the 
district court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue 
alone, applying the test outlined in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-92, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066-67, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695-96, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. 
Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984), and Bundy v. DeLand, 763 
P.2d at 805. 
WE CONCUR: 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Hall, Chief Justice, and Stewart, Justice, concur in 
the result. 
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